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ARTICLES
Clash and Convergence on Ethical Issues
in International Arbitration
John M. Townsend*
International arbitration brings together participants and
legal advisors from many different cultures and legal systems.
Although this is one of the strengths of international arbitration,
it also gives rise to many conflicts, particularly concerning the
rules of ethics to be applied. Nonetheless, great progress has
recently been made in finding common ground on questions of
ethics.
One of the most frequently used methods of constituting an
international arbitral tribunal is for each party to name an arbi-
trator, with a third arbitrator chosen either by the two party-
appointed arbitrators, by agreement of the parties, or by an arbi-
tral institution. The prevailing rule in international arbitration
for many years has been that the party-appointed arbitrators are
to be independent and impartial, even though each is selected by
one side or the other. In contrast, the prevailing American rule,
until this year, was that a party-appointed arbitrator was
expected to be predisposed to decide the dispute in favor of the
party that appointed him with a state of mind generally described
as "non-neutral."1 This divergence between the American and
* John M. Townsend is a partner at Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Washington,
D.C., where he chairs the firm's Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Group. Mr. Townsend also is Chairman of the Executive Committee and a member of
the Board of Directors of the American Arbitration Association. This article was
originally an oral presentation at the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
Symposium on International Arbitration on April 2, 2004, in Miami, Florida.
1. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (American
Arbitration Association 1977), available at http:/ /www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid
=15707&JSPsrc=upload \LIVESITE\RulesProcedures \Archives \Archived%2ORules
\code.html. See also AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON
OF 1977 AND 2004 VERSIONS OF THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTEs Canon VII (2004), available at http:/ / www.adr.org / upload / LIVESITE /
RulesProcedures / EthicsStandards/code%20for%20arbitrators%20comparison.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004); See also Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., 280
F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2001).
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international practices has, for many years, prompted critical
commentary, primarily directed at the American model.
Other issues involving similar ethical controversy in interna-
tional arbitration have not given rise to a split as clear-cut as the
party-appointed arbitrator divergence. These topics include: The
disclosures an arbitrator should make in accepting an appoint-
ment, the types of disclosures that should lead to disqualification
of the arbitrator, and when ex parte communications between an
arbitrator and a party are permissible.
Many ethical considerations focus less on the arbitrator than
on the parties and their lawyers. Such issues include: Whether
members of a corporate party's in-house legal department are con-
sidered lawyers for purposes of participating in an arbitration, or
for purposes of applying the protection of attorney-client privilege
to communications between such lawyers and their clients; The
proper role of lawyers in presenting witness testimony to an arbi-
tral tribunal; May a lawyer interview an adverse witness;
Whether a lawyer may help to prepare a friendly witness to tes-
tify, or assist in the drafting of a written witness statement; and
Whether witnesses may be subjected to American-style cross-
examination.
All of these questions have been debated among international
arbitrators. Sometimes the difference in opinion reflects differ-
ences between the legal traditions that we refer to as common law
systems, principally those of the English-speaking countries, and
those we refer to as civil law systems, embracing most of the
remainder of the world. Sometimes, as with the party-appointed
arbitrator controversy, the divergence is between Americans and
everyone else. Other differences, however, simply reflect differing
practices and customs in particular parts of the world. Almost all
of these divergent opinions have been given considerable atten-
tion, with results that are generally positive.
A number of converging practices have emerged to bridge or
reconcile some of the differing opinions about ethical standards,
and many have been embodied in sets of rules or ethical guide-
lines. This discussion focuses on four key documents, three of
which are very new and seem likely to become milestones in rec-
onciling clashes over arbitral ethical issues. The four documents
are:
* The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration ( "IBA Rules"), which
were issued by the International Bar Association
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
("IBA") in 1999;2
* The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Dis-
putes, usually referred to as the AAA/ABA Code of Eth-
ics, which was originally jointly issued by the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") and the American Bar
Association ("ABA") in 1977, but which was substan-
tially revised effective March 1, 2004;
4
* The new Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation
Procedures ("Commercial Rules") of the AAA, which
came into effect on July 1, 2003;' and
* The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in Interna-
tional Arbitration which have circulated in draft form
since 2002, although the final version was not approved
by the Council of the International Bar Association
until May 22, 2004.6
Each of these documents and its contribution to reconciling one or
more of the ethical divergences in international arbitration will be
discussed in turn.
THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION RULES
The IBA Rules, the first of these documents to be adopted, is
not principally directed at ethical issues. It aims at resolving, or
at least bridging, differences between the common law and civil
law systems of presenting factual evidence to a tribunal.7 The IBA
Rules were developed by a committee of lawyers from both tradi-
tions, who were interested in developing a set of procedures that
could be applied when parties to an international arbitration were
2. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(International Bar Association 1999), available at http://www.ibanet.org/pdf-
resolutions ! IBA % 20Rules % 20on % 20the % 20Taking % 20of% 20Evidence%20in%20
International%20Arbitration%201999.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
3. The 1977 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES is
available at http: / / www.adr.org / index2.1.jsp?JSPssid = 15707&JSPsrc = upload \
LIVESITE \ RulesProcedures \Archives \Archived%20Rules \ code.html.
4. The 2004 Revision of the CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES is available at http://www.adr.orglindex2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15718&JSPsrc=
upload \ LIVESITE \RulesProcedures \ EthicsStandards \ codeofethics2004.htm.
5. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES (American
Arbitration Association 2003), available at http: / / www.adr.org/ index2.1.jsp?JSPssid
=15747&JSPsrc=upload \LIVESITE\RulesProcedures \ NationalInternational\. .
\focusArea\commercial\AAA235current.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
6. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION
(International Bar Association 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.orglpdf/
InternationalArbitrationGuidelines.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
7. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 2.
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from opposing traditions.8 These rules have gained widespread
acceptance for the purpose for which they were prepared, but that
is beyond the scope of this paper.9 The rules are of interest here
because they also address a number of ethical issues.
The subject of witness preparation has been a touchy one in
international arbitration, because the civil law system tradition-
ally has put very little trust in witness testimony and therefore,
developed few rules for how to present it. 10 Such rules as existed
tended to assume that witnesses were likely to lie, and that
allowing lawyers to talk with a witness before the magistrate had
a chance to examine him was only likely to help the witness lie
more convincingly.1 In many countries, Argentina being a well-
known example, it was and still is considered unethical for a law-
yer to speak with a witness before the witness is examined. To a
common law lawyer, or at least to an American lawyer, it would
border on malpractice to allow a witness to testify without having
been prepared by a lawyer. There have been cases involving an
Argentine party on one side and a common law party on the other
in which the Argentine party indignantly sought sanctions when
it emerged that the opposing lawyer had prepared the witness to
testify.
The solution adopted by the IBA Rules takes the form of a
simple statement: "It shall not be improper for a Party, its officers,
employees, legal advisors, or other representatives to interview its
witnesses or potential witnesses." 2 This provision helps avoid
objections of the type just described, and now appears to have
been generally accepted as the international ethical norm. Com-
mon law lawyers with civil law adversaries would still do well to
proceed with caution when interviewing witnesses, especially hos-
tile witnesses likely to report to the adversary on the interview. It
may be prudent to raise this issue with the arbitrators in a prelim-
inary conference to assure that all parties to the arbitration have
a common understanding of what kind of advance contact with
witnesses will be acceptable in that proceeding.
A related subject that is not addressed by the IBA Rules is
whether it is ethically acceptable for a lawyer to help a witness
8. Id.
9. See Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common
Law-Civil Law Divide in Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 59 (2002).
10. Id. at 62-63.
11. Id.
12. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 2, at art. 4.3.
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draft the written witness statement that frequently takes the
place of direct testimony in international arbitration." Lawyers
who become too involved in the drafting of such statements run
the risk of embarrassment when the witness is asked at the hear-
ing about who wrote his statement. Many lawyers consider it an
ethical problem when a lawyer writes a statement and asks a wit-
ness to sign it. Whether an objection to a lawyer having done so
would be taken seriously by the tribunal is, like many close ethical
calls involving cultural differences, likely to depend heavily on
who the arbitrators are, and especially on the background and
predilections of the arbitrator in the chair. A lawyer concerned
about an adverse reaction would probably do well to allow the wit-
ness to write the first draft of his statement, and to confine the
lawyer's role to editing that statement, even if the edits turn out
to be substantial.
The IBA Rules also have been helpful in resolving the long-
standing civil lawyers' objection to cross-examination, at least as
practiced by actors portraying American lawyers in the motion
pictures. Cross-examination is not a form of advocacy that is well
developed in most civil law countries, because commercial cases in
civil law jurisdictions tend to be decided on the basis of docu-
ments, with relatively little live testimony. 14 When witnesses do
testify in civil law proceedings, they are questioned by the judge,
and lawyers for the parties are generally confined to suggesting
additional questions to the judge after he or she has finished.
Many civil law practitioners are therefore uncomfortable con-
ducting cross-examination in an arbitration hearing, and are even
more uncomfortable with the idea of subjecting their clients to
cross-examination by an American litigator or an English
barrister.
The IBA Rules put to rest any concern about cross-examina-
tion being considered unethical, which was the view of some oppo-
nents of the practice, although the rules respect the sensibilities of
those opponents enough to avoid using the term "cross-examina-
tion."5 Section 8.2 of the IBA Rules provides: "Following direct
testimony, any other Party may question such witness, in an order
to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal." Preserving civil law
ideas about the prerogatives of the judge, the same section of the
13. Id. at arts. 4.4.-4.9
14. See Elsing & Townsend, supra note 9, at 62-63.
15. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 2, at art. 8.9.
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IBA Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal may put questions to
a witness at any time.
The IBA Rules again wrap a common law ethical rule in civil
law language in addressing the problem of privilege. The civil law
does not provide the same evidentiary privileges as most common
law jurisdictions, largely because the civil law provides for very
little discovery in commercial cases, with correspondingly less
need for protection from that sort of intrusion." Most civil law
countries protect communications between a client and a lawyer
from disclosure, principally under the rubric of professional
secrecy, but with some extremely significant reservations.17
Under the laws of some civil law countries, such as France, Italy,
and Switzerland, and also under European Union law, communi-
cations between a corporate client and its in-house lawyers are not
protected, because such employee lawyers are not considered to be
sufficiently independent to merit the protection of professional
secrecy."8
The IBA Rules address the problem of privilege by urging
arbitrators to respect legal privileges, but without any explicit ref-
erence to the touchy problem of inside counsel. The IBA Rules
provide, in Section 9.2:
The Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a Party or on
its own motion, exclude from evidence or production any
document, statement, oral testimony or inspection for any
of the following reasons:
(b) legal impediment or privilege under the legal or
ethical rules determined by the Arbitral Tribunal to be
applicable;
(g) considerations of fairness or equality of the Parties
that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be
compelling."9
16. See Elsing & Townsend, supra note 9, at 60-61.
17. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Communities,
1982 E.C.R. 1575 (1982). See J. Triplett Mackintosh & Kristen M. Angus, Conflict in
Confidentiality: How E.U. Laws Leave In-House Counsel Outside the Privilege, 38
INT'L LAw. 35 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European
Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 (1982); Order of the President of the Court of First
Instance of 30 October 2003 in Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 R: Akzo Nobel
Chems., Ltd. & Akcros Chems., Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 2003
O.J. (C 35) 10. See also Macintosh & Angus, supra note 17.
19. IBA RULES ON THE TARING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 2, at arts. 9.2(b), (g).
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By placing considerations of fairness and equality on an equal
footing with legal and ethical rules, Section 9.2(g) provides arbi-
trators with the tool they need to deal with divergent legal and
ethical rules.20 The in-house counsel problem, for example, may
arise in an arbitration with a Swiss corporate party on one side
and an American party on the other. The American party may
seek disclosure of communications between the Swiss party and
its in-house counsel, arguing that such communications are not
privileged under the law of Switzerland, where the communica-
tions took place. The American party would, at the same time,
vehemently resist disclosure of its communications with its own
in-house lawyer, arguing that Section 9.2(b) of the IBA Rules
requires the tribunal to respect the American rules of privilege
that protect such communications.21 Most international arbitra-
tors would now resolve such a dispute by reference to Section
9.2(g), and would decide either that the communications between
both parties and their in-house lawyers should be protected, as a
matter of fairness and equality, or that neither set of communica-
tions should be protected, on the same basis.22 The mandate to
conduct the proceedings with fairness and equality would be inter-
preted to trump any invocation of privilege under Section 9.2(b)
that would result in unfair or unequal treatment.
THE REVISED CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS
The revised Code of Ethics became effective on March 1, 2004,
after extensive study by several sections of the American Bar
Association and a committee formed by the American Arbitration
Association regarding how the 1977 code should be adapted to
encompass the developments in arbitration law since its adop-
tion.24 The most dramatic change made in the 2004 revision to the
Code of Ethics was the abandonment of the traditional American
assumption that party-appointed arbitrators would be considered
non-neutral. This assumption had been codified in Canon VII of
the 1977 code: "In all arbitrations in which there are two or more
party-appointed arbitrators . . .the two party-appointed arbitra-
tors should be considered non-neutrals unless both parties inform
20. Id. at 9.2(g).
21. Id. at 9.2(b).
22. Id. at 9.2(g).
23. Id. at 9.2(b), (g).
24. Bruce Meyerson & John M. Townsend, Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial
Arbitrators Explained, 59 Disp. RESOL. J. 10 (2004) (describing the revision process
and principal changes to the 1977 code).
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the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral ....
This provision of the 1977 code accurately reflected American
practice at the time, and has since been widely accepted by the
courts as stating the norm for American arbitration.26 It had, nev-
ertheless, been widely criticized as inconsistent with international
standards and identified as one of the reasons that parties were
likely to avoid the United States as a venue for arbitrations.27
This presumption of the non-neutrality of party-appointed
arbitrators was not merely abandoned in the 2004 revision of the
Code of Ethics, it was reversed. The revised Code of Ethics, in the
words of its Note on Neutrality: "[Elstablishes a presumption of
neutrality for all arbitrators, including party-appointed arbitra-
tors, which applies unless the parties' agreement, the arbitration
rules agreed to by the parties or applicable laws provide other-
wise. "2' The revised presumption is codified in Canon IX.A of the
revised Code of Ethics: "In tripartite arbitrations to which this
Code applies, all three arbitrators are presumed to be neutral and
are expected to observe the same standards as the third arbitra-
tor."29 By neutral, the 2004 revision means that an arbitrator
should be "independent and impartial."30 As that is the prevailing
international standard, this 180-degree reversal of the presump-
tion of non-neutrality effectively brings American arbitration into
line with international practice. 1
25. 1977 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon VII
(1977), supra note 3.
26. E.g., Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., 280 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2001).
27. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
pmbl.
28. Id.
29. Id. at Canon IX.A.
30. Id. at pmbl.
31. The International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
available at www.adr.org, already followed the international norm: "Arbitrators
acting under these rules shall be impartial and independent." (Art. 7.1). Similarly,
the London Court of International Arbitration Rules provides that, "All arbitrators
conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times
impartial and independent of the parties ... ." ARBITRATION; RULES, CLAUSES, &
COSTS art. 5.2 (London Court of Int'l Arb. 2004), available at http://www.lcia-
arbitration.com/arb/uk.htm#e (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). The International Chamber
of Commerce considers impartiality to be a state of mind that cannot be legislated,
but requires in its Rules of Arbitration that, "Every arbitrator must be and remain
independent of the parties involved in the arbitration." RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 7.1
(Int'l Chamber of Commerce 1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/
english /arbitration /pdf documents / rules/rules.arb-english.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,
2004).
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THE NEW AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
COMMERCIAL RULES
As the committees working on revising the Code of Ethics
began to realize that they were in general agreement on reversing
the presumption of non-neutrality of party-appointed arbitrators
in the 1977 code, the American Arbitration Association realized
that reversal of that presumption would require significant
changes in its flagship Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation
Procedures.2 The version of the Commercial Rules in effect prior
to July 2003 had the presumption on non-neutrality built into it in
a number of places." The AAA therefore began the process of
revising its Commercial Rules while the discussions concerning
the Code of Ethics were underway, and actually completed and
issued its revised Commercial Rules on July 1, 2003, several
months before the revised Code of Ethics became effective. 4
The new Commercial Rules adopted, in Section R-12(b), the
same presumption of neutrality as the revised Code of Ethics:
Where the parties have agreed that each party is to name
one arbitrator, the arbitrators so named must meet the
standards of Section R-17 with respect to impartiality and
independence unless the parties have specifically agreed
pursuant to Section R-17(a) that the party-appointed arbi-
trators are to be non-neutral and need not meet those
standards. 5
This presumption is elaborated in Section R-17:
(a) Any arbitrator shall be impartial and independent
and shall perform his or her duties with diligence and
in good faith, and shall be subject to disqualification for
(i) partiality or lack of independence . *...36
COMMON PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF ETHICS AND THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION RULES
Both the July 1, 2003, Commercial Arbitration Rules and the
32. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
Summary of Changes.
33. Id.
34. Paul D. Friedland & John M. Townsend, Commentary on the July 2003
Revisions to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 8-13 (2004)
(describing changes to the AAA rules).
35. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-12(b).
36. Id. at R-17(a).
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March 1, 2004 revision of the Code of Ethics contain deliberately
parallel provisions designed to adjust both documents to the new
ethical landscape resulting from the reversal of the presumption
of non-neutrality.
One of these parallel provisions is that the parties to arbitra-
tion may agree to opt out of the reversal of the presumption of
non-neutrality. Both sets of revisions took into account, as the
preamble to the revised Code of Ethics phrases it, that "parties in
certain domestic arbitrations in the United States may prefer that
party-appointed arbitrators be non-neutral."37 In order to respect
the right of parties to arbitration to decide for themselves in what
type of proceeding they wish to engage, both the Code of Ethics, in
Canon IX.B,38 and the revised Commercial Rules, in Section R-
17(a)(iii),39 permit the parties to decide if they prefer to conduct
their arbitration under the old system. Canon X of the revised
Code of Ethics details the specific ethical obligations of non-neu-
tral arbitrators, those arbitrators referred to in the Code of Ethics
as "Canon X Arbitrators."40
The revised Code of Ethics also contains a new provision mak-
ing it an ethical obligation of an arbitrator to ascertain and to
advise the parties whether he or she is serving as a neutral arbi-
trator or a Canon X Arbitrator.4' Canon IX.C of the Code of Ethics
provides:
A party-appointed arbitrator has an obligation to ascertain,
as early as possible but not later than the first meeting of
the arbitrators and parties, whether the parties have
agreed that the party-appointed arbitrators will serve as
neutrals or whether they shall be subject to Canon X .... .
The Commercial Rules have no parallel to this provision.4"
Both the revised Code of Ethics and the new Commercial
Rules make it clear that a primary consequence following from the
service of all arbitrators as neutrals is that no ex parte contacts
37. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), supra note
4, at pmbl.
38. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon IX.B.
39. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-17(a)(iii).
40. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon X.
41. Id. at Canon IX.C.
42. Id.
43. See Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures, supra note 5.
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are to be permitted between any party and any arbitrator once the
tribunal is constituted." These rules on ex parte contacts follow
logically from the reversal of the presumption of non-neutrality,
and represent an additional point upon which American practice
has now conformed to international standards.
The revised Code of Ethics, in Canon III.B, states that "[a]n
arbitrator or prospective arbitrator should not discuss a proceed-
ing with any party in the absence of any other party .... -145 Simi-
larly, the new AAA Rules provide, in Section R-18(a): "No party
and no one acting on behalf of any party shall communicate ex
parte with an arbitrator or a candidate for arbitrator concerning
the arbitration .... ,,41 The 1977 code, in Canon VII.C(2), in con-
trast, had permitted non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators to
"communicate with the party who appointed them concerning any
... aspect of the case, provided they first inform the other arbitra-
tors and the parties that they intend to do so."47 Both the revised
Code of Ethics, in Canon X.C, and the new AAA Rules, in Section
R-18(b), make it clear that the general prohibition on ex parte con-
tacts does not apply to Canon X arbitrators, although even they
are subjected to more restrictions on their ability to communicate
with the parties than they were under the 1977 Code.4' The most
notable of these restrictions is that even Canon X arbitrators may
not, under Canon X.C(4), disclose deliberations of the tribunal or
decisions of the tribunal before they are announced, or communi-
cate about any particular subject once the record is closed and the
subject is submitted for decision.49
Both the revised Code of Ethics, in Canon III.B(2)-(4), and the
new Commercial Rules, at Section R-18-A, contain exceptions to
the rule against ex parte contacts that apply to all party-appointed
44. See id.; CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra
note 4.
45. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon III.B.
46. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-18(a).
47. 1977 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note
3, at Canon VII.C.2.
48. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon X.C.; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDITATION PROCEDURES, supra note
5, at R-18(b); SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON OF 1977 AND 2004 VERSIONS OF THE CODE OF
ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at Canon VII.C.
49. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon X.C.4.
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arbitrators. 0 However, the exceptions are very narrowly drawn.
Ex parte contacts between a party-appointed arbitrator and the
party that appointed him are permitted, after the arbitrator's
appointment, for only three purposes:
* To discuss the appointment of the third arbitrator,
* To discuss the party-appointed arbitrator's compensa-
tion, and
* To discuss whether the party-appointed arbitrator is to
serve as a neutral.51
The exception for discussion of compensation is not found in the
Commercial Rules, because such conversations are handled by the
AAA administrator under Section R-51(c) of those rules. 2
Finally, both the revised Code of Ethics and the new Commer-
cial Rules tackle the sensitive subject of what a prospective arbi-
trator should disclose in accepting an appointment as an
arbitrator. 3 Disclosure is a sensitive matter for at least two rea-
sons. First, the failure of an arbitrator to disclose an interest in
the proceedings or circumstances that might indicate a bias in
favor of or against one of the parties has been frequently asserted
as a basis for a court to set aside an arbitration award. 4 Second,
the arbitration community is divided, both in the United States
and internationally, between those who believe that a disclosure
should generally be treated as a precaution by an arbitrator who
believes that he or she will be independent and impartial, and
those who believe that a disclosure should be presumptively
treated as a basis for disqualification.
The revised Code of Ethics, in dealing with disclosure, first
makes it clear in its preamble that the same standards of disclo-
sure now apply to all arbitrators, whether party-appointed or not
50. Id. at Canon III.B.2-4; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION
PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at R-18(a).
51. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
Canon III.B.2-4.
52. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULEs & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-51(c).
53. See id.; CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DIspuTEs, supra
note 4.
54. E.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150
(1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C.,
Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1999); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714
F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983); Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. Corp., 751
A.2d 426, 441 (Del. Ch. 1999); Judge Scheindlin, Decision of Interest; Arbitrator's
Prior Business Relationship Does Not Warrant Vacating Arbitration Award, N.Y.L.J.,
October 29, 2004 (Skyview Owners Corp. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local
32BJ, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y., Oct. 5, 2004).
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and whether they are neutral or are serving under Canon X:
"This Code requires all party-appointed arbitrators, whether neu-
tral or not, to make pre-appointment disclosures of any facts
which might affect their neutrality, independence, or impartial-
ity."5 This is echoed in the new Commercial Rules, at Section R-
16(a), which requires "[a]ny person appointed or to be appointed
as an arbitrator" to make the same disclosures. 6 The previous
version of the Commercial Rules, at Section R-19(a), had required
only neutral arbitrators to make full disclosures,57 and the 1977
code, in Canon VII.B, had similarly required less in the way of
disclosure by party-appointed arbitrators than by neutral
arbitrators .
The revised Code of Ethics, in Canon II.A, specifies what a
prospective arbitrator has an ethical duty to disclose. The key
items are:
* any known direct or indirect financial or personal inter-
est in the outcome of the arbitration;
" any known existing or past financial, business, profes-
sional or personal relationships which might reasonably
affect impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of
any of the parties ... ; and
* the nature and extent of any prior knowledge they may
have of the dispute .. .
The new Commercial Rules, in Section 16(a), adopt essentially the
same rule of disclosure, in a more general form:
Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator
shall disclose to the AAA any circumstance likely to give
rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence, including any bias or any financial or per-
sonal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or
present relationship with the parties or their representa-
tives .... 60
55. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
pmbl.
56. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-16(a).
57. Id. at R-16; See also SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON Of 1977 AND 2004 VERSIONS OF
THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 1, at
Summary of Recent Changes.
58. SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON OF 1977 AND 2004 VERSIONS OF THE CODE OF ETHICS
FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 1, at Canon VII.B.
59. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4, at
II.A.
60. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5, at
R-16(a).
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There are subtle differences between the two standards. The
Code of Ethics only requires a prospective arbitrator to disclose
known interests in the outcome or relationships,6 while the Com-
mercial Rules contain no such explicit limitation. 2 The Code of
Ethics also applies a subjective test to disclosures of relationships,
requiring the disclosure of those that might reasonably affect
impartiality or independence in the eyes of the parties, but an
objective test to the disclosure of interests which are to be. dis-
closed without any such limitation. The Commercial Rules apply
the same subjective test, "likely to give rise to justifiable doubt,"
both to interests and to relationships.6 The Commercial Rules do
not explicitly require disclosure of prior knowledge of the dispute,
although such knowledge could well come within the general
umbrella of "any circumstance."65 These are minor variations,
however. Both documents take a clear stand in favor of full disclo-
sure of relevant information by all arbitrators.6
The new Commercial Rules include a very useful addition to
the ongoing development of rules about disclosure. They include
for the first time, in Section R-16(c), a statement designed as an
antidote to the view that disclosure should generally result in dis-
qualification. The new provision reads: "In order to encourage
disclosure by arbitrators, disclosure of information pursuant to
this Section R-16 is not to be construed as an indication that the
arbitrator considers that the disclosed circumstance is likely to
61. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4.
62. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5.
63. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4.
64. See supra text accompanying note 60.
65. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5.
66. American disclosure rules have to some extent been affected by the California
Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, which create an
extremely burdensome set of disclosure requirements for arbitrators. International
arbitrations are currently exempted from the California standards, so those
standards will not be discussed here, but those standards have nevertheless caused
widespread concern among international arbitrators. ETHICS STANDARDS FOR
NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION (Judicial Council of Cal. 2002),
available at www.arbitrationworks.com/pdfforms/NewArbEthicsCA.pdf (last visited
Oct. 18, 2004); See also CAL. Cwv. CODE § 1281.85 (2004); AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL
ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA FACT SHEET (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/
index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPsrc=upload \ LIVESITE \ Forms \ stateSpecific\. .
.\ focusArea \ consumer\ CA%20-%20Ethical%2OStandards%20Fact%20Sheet%20-
%2012-30-02%20draft.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). See also Azteca Constr., Inc. v.
ADR Consulting, Inc., 2004 EL 1895135 (Cal. App. 3d) for an interesting application
of the California disclosure rules.
67. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 5.
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affect impartiality or independence."68  That statement should
give considerable comfort to arbitrators who feel the pressure
from sources such as court decisions and the California Ethics
Standards to make every disclosure they can think of, but who
might be reluctant to jeopardize an appointment by disclosing
information that seems essentially trivial. The Commercial Rules
provide a framework within which disclosures can be made with-
out appearing to invite disqualification. This is a healthy
approach to resolving the tension between the need to build confi-
dence in the arbitration process by assuring that appropriate dis-
closures are made, and the risk of making the process unworkable
if frivolous challenges to the appointment of arbitrators are
encouraged.
THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES
The most recent contribution to the development of a body of
common ethical standards for international commercial arbitra-
tion is the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, issued in final form on May 22, 2004.69 The IBA
Guidelines represent an attempt to build upon the success of the
IBA Rules as a statement of converging solutions to procedural
problems, by attempting to craft converging solutions to some of
the ethical problems that arise in international arbitration.
The IBA Guidelines focus on the problem of disclosure, which
is just as serious a concern in the international arena as it is in
the United States. One of the reasons for concern about disclo-
sure, perhaps inevitably, is that the American attitude toward the
subject differs from that of much of the rest of the world. The
American approach is generally that as much as possible should
be disclosed, so that the parties, the arbitrators, the arbitral insti-
tution, and any reviewing court have all the potentially relevant
information available to sort out, on a case-by-case basis, the
information that makes a difference. Indeed, the revised Code of
Ethics, in Canon II.D, counsels prospective arbitrators that "Any
doubt as to whether or not disclosure is to be made should be
resolved in favor of disclosure."0 Continental European practice,
in contrast, has historically been that only conflicts perceived to
68. Id. at R-16(c).
69. See IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra
note 6.
70. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DIsPUTES, supra note 4,
Canon II.D.
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be serious need to be disclosed, largely to minimize frivolous chal-
lenges. The problem with that approach is that it tends to lead to
the assumption that every disclosure is a ground for
disqualification.
These approaches to disclosure can clash seriously. For
example, an arbitration with its seat in the United States but that
is administered by a European arbitral institution may prove
problematic. An arbitrator appointed to sit on the case would be
well advised to make the broad disclosure that an American court
reviewing an ultimate arbitral award would likely expect, even if
the arbitrator does not believe that the matter disclosed has any
bearing on his or her independence or impartiality, and even if the
rules of the administering institution do not require it. The fail-
ure to make such a disclosure could expose the ultimate award to
challenge in an American court. However, such a disclosure may
also easily lead to that arbitrator being challenged by a party and
disqualified by the institution administering the arbitration, if
that institution has a predisposition not to appoint an arbitrator
who has made any disclosure, no matter how trivial. This is the
acknowledged position of the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC") in appointing chairs and sole arbitrators.7"
The new IBA Guidelines attempt to define what a prospective
arbitrator must disclose. 2 In doing so, the IBA Guidelines open
with a series of general ethical standards. The first of these,
described as a "General Principle," is that: "Every arbitrator shall
be impartial and independent of the parties."73 In codifying
impartiality, in addition to independence, as an essential attri-
bute of an arbitrator, this First General Principle goes beyond the
Article 7.1 of the ICC Rules, which require only that, "Every arbi-
trator must be and remain independent of the parties involved in
the arbitration." It is, however, consistent with the approach of
the revised Code of Ethics, as well as that of the LCIA Rules, the
AAA's International Arbitration Rules, and the new Commercial
Arbitration Rules. 5
The most interesting additions to the ethical norms of inter-
national arbitration under the IBA Guidelines are contained in
the second and third General Standards. The second General
71. RULES OF ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at art. 9.
72. See IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra
note 6.
73. Id. at I(1).
74. RULES OF ARBITRATION, supra note 31, at art. 7.1.
75. See supra note 31.
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Standard, captioned "Conflicts of Interest," recognizes, in effect,
an ethical obligation of a prospective arbitrator to decline an
appointment if he or she has any doubts about his or her ability to
satisfy the first principle:
(a) An arbitrator shall decline to accept an appointment or,
if the arbitration has already been commenced, refuse to
continue to act as an arbitrator if he or she has any doubts
as to his or her ability to be impartial or independent. 6
The same standard adopts an objective standard for when an arbi-
trator should decline an appointment or withdraw:
(b) [I] f facts or circumstances exist, or have arisen since the
appointment, that, from a reasonable third person's point
of view having knowledge of the relevant facts, give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or inde-
pendence, unless the parties have [waived the concern]."
This Second General Principle is consistent with the revised Code
of Ethics, although, in the IBA Guidelines, the directive is framed
as an obligation to decline an appointment rather than as a condi-
tion of accepting one. The revised Code of Ethics states, in Canon
I.B, that "one should accept appointment as an arbitrator only if
fully satisfied: (1) that he or she can serve impartially; [and] (2)
that he or she can serve independently ..
The third General Standard of the IBA Guidelines deals with
disclosure. The provision adopts a subjective test for what a pro-
spective arbitrator should disclose, namely that, "facts or circum-
stances exist that may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to
doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence . . .,,"
This General Standard specifically counsels that: "Any doubt as
to whether an arbitrator should disclose certain facts or circum-
stances should be resolved in favor of disclosure.""° This last pro-
vision is nearly identical to Canon II.D of the revised Code of
Ethics."I
76. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note
6, at I(2)(a).
77. Id. at I(2)(a)-(d) (Subsections (c) and (d) of General Standard 2 define and
illustrate "justifiable doubt").
78. CODE OF ETHics FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4,
Canon I.B (The revised Code of Ethics adds two additional requirements: "(3) that he
or she is competent to serve; and (4) that he or she can be available . . ").
79. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note
6, at I(3)(a).
80. Id. at (I)(3)(c).
81. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 4,
Canon II.D.
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The really interesting feature of the third General Standard
is contained in subsection (b), which provides a framework for rec-
onciling the objective standard for disqualification with the sub-
jective standard for disclosure:
It follows from General Standards 1 and 2(a) that an arbi-
trator who has made a disclosure considers himself or her-
self to be impartial and independent of the parties despite
the disclosed facts and therefore capable of performing his
or her duties as arbitrator. Otherwise he or she would have
declined the nomination or appointment at the outset or
resigned.82
This recognition that disclosure is a means of providing comfort to
parties who might be concerned if they learned of the circum-
stance disclosed from other sources, rather than an invitation to
disqualification, will do more to promote appropriate disclosures
by arbitrators than all of the provisions detailing their obligations
to make disclosures. At least, it will do so if it is accepted by the
institutions that have hereto tended to apply the contrary
presumption.
While this may be the most welcome statement in the IBA
Guidelines, their most conspicuous feature is not the General
Standards, but three color-coded lists grouped under the heading
"Practical Application of the General Standards." 3 These lists,
relating to the Fourth General Standard, which deals with waiv-
ers of disclosed conflicts by the parties, 8' are designed both to help
arbitrators decide what must be disclosed and what need not be,
and to guide parties about what may be waived and what may not
be waived.
The first color-coded list is a "Red List" of circumstances that
will normally prevent an arbitrator from serving. This list is
divided into a "non-waivable Red List" and a "waivable Red List."
The "non-waivable Red List" is a catalog of circumstances that
will always prevent an arbitrator from serving. The "non-waiv-
able list" includes situations in which:
" The arbitrator is a party or an officer, director, or repre-
sentative of a party;
" The arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one
of the parties or in the outcome of the case; or
82. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note
6, at I(3)(b).
83. See id., at II.
84. Id. at 1(4).
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* The arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or
one of its affiliates.85
This creation of a "non-waivable list" of conflicts puts the IBA
Guidelines at odds with the revised Code of Ethics. The Code of
Ethics does not seek to impose any limit on the freedom of the
parties to waive a disclosure, but rather provides, in Canon II.F,
that "When parties, with knowledge of a person's interests and
relationships, nevertheless desire that person to serve as an arbi-
trator, that person may properly serve."86
The "waivable Red List" in the IBA Guidelines is a catalog of
circumstances that will prevent an arbitrator from serving unless
they are waived by the parties. The two Red Lists, therefore, dif-
ferentiate circumstances that may not in any circumstances be
waived and circumstances that, as long as the arbitrator has dis-
closed them, the parties are free to waive. The "waivable Red
List" is quite lengthy, and it includes circumstances one has diffi-
culty imagining the parties would waive, as well as others that
seem likely to be waived. They include, for example:
" The arbitrator has given advice or an opinion to a party
about the dispute;
* The arbitrator owns shares in a party or an affiliate of a
party; and
* The arbitrator represents or advises one of the parties
or is a lawyer in the same firm as one of the counsel to
the parties."
Probably the least controversial of the color-coded lists in the
IBA Guidelines is the "Orange List," which is described as: "[A]
non-exhaustive enumeration of specific situations which (depend-
ing on the facts of a given case) in the eyes of the parties may give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or inde-
pendence."8 An arbitrator has a duty to disclose any circum-
stance on the "Orange List," but the parties are deemed to have
waived the disclosure if they do not object once it is made. The
"Orange List" includes such circumstances as:
* The arbitrator has in the last three years acted as coun-
sel for or against a party;
85. Id. at 11(2).
86. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DispuTEs, supra note 4,
Canon II.F.
87. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT'L ARBITRATION, supra note
6, at 11(9).
88. Id. at II(3).
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" The arbitrator serves as an arbitrator in a related case
involving the same or related parties; and
* The arbitrator and another arbitrator or counsel for one
of the parties are in the same barristers' chambers. 9
The last circumstance listed is an attempt to tackle another of
the touchy subjects in international arbitration. English barris-
ters do not consider that membership in the same chambers
should be confused with membership in the same law firm. It is
not uncommon for barristers from the same chambers to appear
on opposite sides of a case in English court, and they have diffi-
culty understanding why it should raise any question to have two
of them involved in the same arbitration, even if the role of one of
them requires impartiality and independence. Putting the situa-
tion on the "Orange List" may well have been a compromise
between those who might have put it on the "waivable Red List"
and those who might have put it on the "Green List."
The "Green List," the most controversial of the three, is
described in the IBA Guidelines as: "a non-exhaustive list of spe-
cific situations where no appearance of, and no actual, conflict of
interest exists from the objective point of view."90 There is, conse-
quently, no obligation under the IBA Guidelines to disclose situa-
tions on the "Green List," which includes circumstances such as:
* The arbitrator has written an article on the same sub-
ject as involved in the arbitration;
" The arbitrator has previously served with another arbi-
trator; and
* The arbitrator's firm has previously acted against one of
the parties.9
What makes the "Green List" controversial are not the spe-
cific circumstances on that list, or even the circumstances on the
other color-coded lists. One could quibble with the placement of
some items and make a good case for moving many of them from
one list to another, but this challenge is inevitable in any docu-
ment representing efforts to reconcile differing viewpoints. Also,
there is no fundamental conceptual problem with attempting to
define a safe harbor of circumstances that no reasonable person
could consider problematic, especially in a world in which frivo-
lous challenges to arbitrators are too frequently made.
The controversial element of the "Green List" is that it pur-
89. Id. at II(9)(3).
90. Id. at H(6).
91. Id. at II(9)(4).
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ports to enumerate circumstances that not only should not result
in a challenge, but also that need not be disclosed. By doing so in
a document that lacks the force of law in any jurisdiction, the IBA
Guidelines risk creating a trap. For example, an arbitrator in an
international case may well decide, once the IBA Guidelines gain
acceptance, that he or she is not obligated to disclose a circum-
stance on the "Green List." That arbitrator would do well to check
the law of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration is sited, espe-
cially if it is within the United States. An American court is
unlikely to recognize the "Green List" as providing immunity from
the obligation to disclose any circumstance, however trivial, that
the court believes "might create an impression of possible bias."92
If the effect of the "Green List" is to lull an arbitrator into neglect-
ing a disclosure requirement that law applicable to the particular
proceeding may impose, that list will have achieved exactly the
opposite of what its drafters intended.
CONCLUSION
None of the four documents discussed in this paper will either
eliminate ethical problems in international arbitration or differ-
ences of opinion about how to deal with them. But, taken
together, they represent a significant set of advances in recon-
ciling differing points of view and in devising converging stan-
dards and practices. Their combined effect should be to provide
valuable guidance to parties, arbitrators, and arbitral institutions
in resolving many differences between cultures and legal systems
that otherwise lead to ethical conflicts. The documents also
represent, collectively, a significant advance in bringing American
and international ethical standards into harmony.
92. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968);
Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260, 1263 (2d Cir. 1973).
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